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Abstract. We introduce notions of increasingness for the best reply of a
game that capture properly the intuitive idea of complementarity among play-
ers’ strategies. We show, by generalizing the ﬁxpoint theorems of Veinott
and Zhou, that the Nash sets of our games with increasing best replies are
nonempty complete lattices. Hence we extend the class of games with strate-
gic complementarities.
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11. Introduction
Games whose normal form exhibits an increasing joint best reply are usually
referred to, in the economic literature, as games with strategic complementarities
(Vives, 2005). The main notion of increasingness for the best reply that is adopted
in the literature on games with strategic complementarities is due to Veinott (see
Topkis, 1978, and Section 3 of the present paper).
Individual best replies can be made to be Veinott-increasing by means of a theory
of monotone comparative statics in which individual payoﬀs are assumed to be
supermodular or quasisupermodular in own strategies, and to satisfy increasing
diﬀerences or single crossing conditions in the strategies of opponents (See Topkis
1978, Veinott 1992 and Milgrom and Shannon 1994). For this reason, games with
strategic complementarities are also known as supermodular games.
In supermodular games, the product of individual strategy sets is assumed to be
a complete lattice (see Section 2 for the relevant deﬁnitions). For a correspondence
deﬁned from a complete lattice into itself, and that is increasing in the sense of
Veinott, a ﬁxpoint theorem has been proved by Veinott (1992) and Zhou (1994)
showing that the ﬁxpoint set is a nonempty complete lattice. This theorem is an
extension to correspondences of the celebrated Tarski’s ﬁxpoint theorem (Tarski,
1955). Vives (1990) is also a work in this direction.
These ﬁxpoint results allow to establish, for games with strategic complemen-
tarities, that Nash equilibria exist and that the Nash set is a complete lattice. The
latter implies in particular that a least and a greatest Nash equilibrium exist; a
property that is often used in applications.
Hence, the current theory of games with strategic complementarities is a beau-
tiful merge of monotone comparative statics results and ﬁxpoint results.
However Veinott’s increasingness, which is the crucial ingredient in the ﬁxpoint
part of the theory, while convenient from a mathematical point of view, does not
bear any direct connection with the intuitive idea of complementarity; and this is
the main motivation of the present paper.
The intuitive idea of two activities being complements, for example tea and
lemon, is that increasing the level of one makes somehow desirable to increase the
level of the other. Elaborating on previous work by Calciano (2007), we introduce
in this paper notions of increasingness for the joint best reply of a game that are
weaker than Veinott’s one, and linked more directly with this intuitive idea of
complementarity.
We show that games whose joint best reply satisﬁes our increasingness notions
retain the main properties of supermodular games; namely, that a least and a
greatest Nash equilibrium point exist and that, furthermore, the Nash set is a
nonempty complete lattice. We attain this result by generalizing Veinott’s and
Zhou’s ﬁxpoint theorems. The generalization concerns not only the increasingness
notion, but also the space in which the best reply takes values.
To introduce our approach and relate it to the work carried out in Calciano
(2007), consider for example a two-player game whose individual strategy spaces
are Z ⊆ R and T ⊆ R. Let B : T → Z be the best reply of the corresponding
player.
1As claimed in Calciano (2007), a good notion of increasingness for B, one that
captures our intuition about the meaning of complementarity, is that for all oppo-
nent’s strategies x,y ∈ T such that x ≤ y,
∀a ∈ B (x),∃b ∈ B (y) : a ≤ b.
Indeed, if after an increase in opponent’s strategy from x to y, there is some
optimal response a ∈ B (x) such that every optimal response b ∈ B (y) is strictly
less than a, then we must conclude that the increase in opponent’s action has
made desirable to decrease the action of the player, against our intuitive idea of
complementarity.
This notion of increasingness, called upper increasingness in Calciano (2007),
once imposed on individual best replies is preserved under cartesian products, and
hence inherited by the joint best reply of the game. Furthermore, it is much weaker
than Veinott-increasingness. Calciano (2007) has shown that upper increasingness
yields to the existence of a greatest Nash equilibrium point, while its dual, called
lower increasingness, yields to the existence of a least Nash equilibrium point.
Moreover Calciano (2007) has shown that, if the restrictions of the best reply
to certain subsets of the strategy space are all lower increasing, then the Nash
set is a nonempty complete lattice. However, these subsets could be in principle
inﬁnitely many, and no global condition on the best reply was given to assure that
the required property would hold for all the restrictions involved.
This paper ﬁx the problem. A new global notion of increasingness is introduced
for the best reply which makes, together with other assumptions, the Nash set be
a nonempty complete lattice. This new notion is still substantially weaker than
Veinott-increasingness.
As it is the case for Veinott’s and Zhou’s theorems, also our more general ﬁxpoint
results can be proved by using Tarski’s ﬁxpoint theorem. Accordingly, our results
stand in the same relation to Tarski’s ﬁxpoint theorem that Kakutani’s ﬁxpoint
theorem does to Brouwer’s.
However, we prove our results without using Tarski’s theorem and, in gen-
eral, without selection arguments. We investigate the relation of our theorems
to increasing-selection arguments in the last part of the paper.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 contains the necessary background
material and terminology. Section 3 introduces our monotonicity notions. Section
4 presents our ﬁxpoint results. Section 5 discusses increasing selections.
2. Background Material
Let X be a nonempty set. A partial order on X is a reﬂexive, antisymmetric and
transitive binary relation ≤ on X. The set X together with ≤ is called a partially
ordered set, or a poset. Its dual, denoted by Xd, is the set X endowed with the
relation ≥ deﬁned as x ≥ y ⇔ y ≤ x.
For any nonempty subsets T ⊆ S ⊆ X of a poset X we denote, when they
exist, by ∧T and ∨T respectively the inf and sup of T in X, and by ∧ST and ∨ST
respectively the inf and sup of T in S. We denote, when they exists, by a ∧ b and
a ∨ b respectively the inf and sup in X of the subset {a,b} ⊆ X. A subset S ⊆ X
has a least (greatest) element if ∧S ∈ S (if ∨S ∈ S).
2A poset X is a join (meet) lattice if every nonempty and ﬁnite subset of X has
a supremum (an inﬁmum). Dually, X is a join (meet) lattice if and only if Xd is a
meet (join) lattice. X is a lattice if it is both a join and meet lattice.
A poset X is a join-complete (meet-complete) lattice if every nonempty subset of
X (not necessarily ﬁnite) has a supremum (an inﬁmum). X is join-complete (meet-
complete) if and only if its dual is meet-complete (join-complete). A join-complete
lattice has a greatest element 1, and a meet-complete lattice has a least element 0.
X is a complete lattice if it is both a join-complete and a meet-complete lattice;
or equivalently if it is join (meet) complete and has a least (greatest) element.
A subset S ⊆ X of a poset X is a (complete) lattice whenever it is so in the
induced order; that is, whenever for every nonempty (not necessarily) ﬁnite subset
T ⊆ S, ∨ST ∈ S and ∧ST ∈ S. Subset S is a (subcomplete) sublattice of X
whenever for every nonempty (not necessarily) ﬁnite subset T ⊆ S, ∨T ∈ S and
∧T ∈ S.
A subcomplete sublattice of X is a complete lattice, while the converse is false:
a subset of X can be a complete lattice without being not even a sublattice of X.
By a correspondence we mean a point-to-set mapping. A correspondence F :
X → X is said to be nonempty if F (x) is nonempty for every x ∈ X. Whenever
we write a deﬁnition or theorem about correspondences in this paper, we always
assume that these are nonempty.
A correspondence F : X → X is said to have a least (greatest) element if F (x)
has a least (greatest) element for every x ∈ X; that is, if for every x ∈ X there
exists some 0x ∈ F (x) such that 0x ≤ y for every y ∈ F (x).
A selection from F is any function f : X → X such that f (x) ∈ F (x) for every
x ∈ X.
3. Increasing Correspondences
Let X be a poset and F : X → X be a correspondence. We say that F is upper
(lower) increasing if for every x,y ∈ X, x ≤ y implies that for every a ∈ F (x) (for
every b ∈ F (y)), there is some b ∈ F (y) (some a ∈ F (x)) such that a ≤ b.
These properties are dual, in the sense that F is upper (lower) increasing on X if
and only if it is lower (upper) increasing on Xd. Antoniadou (2007) uses upper and
lower increasingness, which she calls - in terms of the corresponding set relations
- the pathwise-lower-than relation, to study the comparative statics of consumer
problems. Calciano (2007) uses upper and lower increasingness to study ﬁxpoint
problems for correspondences deﬁned on posets and lattices.
Let now X be a lattice. We say that F is Veinott-increasing1 if for every x,y ∈ X,
x ≤ y implies that for every a ∈ F (x) and every b ∈ F (y), a ∨ b ∈ F (y) (called
join increasingness), and a ∧ b ∈ F (x) (called meet increasingness).
The two following properties are introduced in this paper for the ﬁrst time, to
be best of our knowledge2. We say that F is strongly upper (lower) increasing if
for every x,y ∈ X, x ≤ y implies that for every a ∈ F (x) and b ∈ F (y), there is
some q ∈ F (y) (some p ∈ F (x)) such that a ≤ q ≤ a ∨ b (such that a ∧ b ≤ p ≤ b).
1Topkis (1978) ascribes this notion of increasingness to Arthur Veinott.
2Calciano (2007, Def. 2), misleadingly enough, uses the same names but to denote diﬀerent
properties.
3Notice that we do not require neither a ∨ b to belong to F (y), nor a ∧ b to belong
to F (x).
Clearly, F is strongly upper (lower) increasing on X if and only if it is strongly
lower (upper) increasing on Xd.
If F is a function, all the notions of increasingness introduced so far boil down to
the function being increasing, by which we mean that if x ≤ y, then F (x) ≤ F (y).
Upper (lower) increasingness is implied by strong upper (lower) increasingness,
which in turn is implied by join (meet) increasingness. But the converses do not
hold.
4. Fixpoint Theorems
In this section we prove ﬁxpoint theorems for increasing correspondences. Our
theorems generalize those of Veinott (1992, Ch. 4, Th. 14) and Zhou (1994, Th.
1). Our main result is Theorem 3, where we establish conditions in terms of the
increasingness of the correspondence and of existence of extremal elements that
make the correspondence ﬁxpoint set be a nonempty complete lattice.
Similarly to Zhou’s theorem, also our ﬁxpoint results can be proved by increasing-
selection arguments, hence mainly by Tarski’s ﬁxpoint theorem. Accordingly, our
results stand in the same relation to Tarski’s ﬁxpoint theorem that Kakutani’s
ﬁxpoint theorem does to Brouwer’s.
However, we prove our results without using Tarski’s theorem and, in general,
without selection arguments. Zhou as well does not use Tarki’s theorem, while
Veinott uses it directly. We will relate our theorems to increasing-selection argu-
ments in the next section.
Associate to a correspondence F : X → X, where X is a poset, the two sets
A := {x ∈ X : F (x) ∩ [x,+∞) 6= ∅},
B := {x ∈ X : F (x) ∩ (−∞,x] 6= ∅}.
A is the set of elements x of X at which F stays above the diagonal, by which
we mean that some element of F (x) is greater than or equal to x. Set B is the dual
of A. The ﬁxpoint set of F is exactly the intersection of A and B.
We report here, for completeness and ease of comparison with our results, both
Tarski’s and Veinott-Zhou’s ﬁxpoint theorems3.
Theorem 0 (Tarski 1955, Th. 1): Let X be a complete lattice and f : X → X
be an increasing function. (a) ∨A and ∧B are, respectively, the greatest and least
ﬁxpoint of f; and (b) the ﬁxpoint set of f is a complete lattice.
Theorem 1 (Veinott 1992, Ch. 4, Th. 14. Zhou 1994, Th. 1): Let X be
a complete lattice and F : X → X be a correspondence. If F is Veinott-increasing
3Veinott’s ﬁxpoint theorem is indeed cast in a broader context. For a correspondence F :
X × T → X, where X is a complete lattice, T a poset, and F is Veinott-increasing on X × T and
subcomplete-sublattice-valued for each t, Veinott proves that the sets of selections and increasing
selections from the associated ﬁxpoint correspondence E : T → X are nonempty complete lattices
with common least and greatest elements. For the special case of T = {t}, this amounts to the
statement of Theorem 1 upon recognizing that, in such a case, the sets of selections and increasing
selections from E : T → X coincide.
4and F (x) is a subcomplete sublattice of X for every x ∈ X, then (a) ∨A and ∧B
are, respectively, the greatest and least ﬁxpoint of F; and (b) the ﬁxpoint set of F
is a complete lattice.
We prove now, in its general form, a simple result which will be used in proving
the theorems which follow. Zhou, in his proof of Theorem 1, prove the result
separately for the special cases of A and of arbitrary subsets of the ﬁxpoint set of
F, while Veinott (1992, Ch. 4, Th. 11) proves the result for the special case of
increasing functions.
Lemma 1: Let X be a poset and F : X → X be a correspondence. (i) If F
is upper increasing and has a greatest element, then for every nonempty subset
S ⊆ A, if ∨S exists then it belongs to A. (ii) If F is lower increasing and has a
least element, then for every nonempty subset T ⊆ B, if ∧T exists then it belongs
to B.
Proof: We prove (i). Point (ii) then follows by duality. Pick any S ⊆ A and any
x ∈ S. By the deﬁnition of A, there is y ∈ F (x) such that x ≤ y. Since x ≤ ∨S,
by upper increasingness of F for such y ∈ F (x) there exists z ∈ F (∨S) such that
y ≤ z. Let 1 ∈ F (∨S) be the greatest element of F (∨S). Clearly x ≤ y ≤ z ≤ 1.
Hence 1 majorizes S and so ∨S ≤ 1. Thus ∨S ∈ A. Q.E.D.
By Lemma 1, when X is a complete lattice A is a join-subcomplete sublattice of
X and, having a least element (the least element of X), it is also a meet-complete
lattice. Of course, A it is not necessarily a subcomplete sublattice of X. Dually, B
is a meet-subcomplete and join-complete lattice 4.
Theorem 2 below generalizes point (a) of Theorem 1 in two respects. First, it
requires the correspondence F to be upper (lower) increasing, instead of Veinott
increasing. Second, it requires for any x ∈ X that F (x) has a greatest (least)
element, instead of requiring it to be a subcomplete sublattice of X.
We state Theorem 2 in the context of posets. This is to underscore the fact that,
in point (a) of Theorems 0 and 1, the completeness of lattice X plays the only role
of making the theorems non-vacuous, but is not a crucial ingredient of the proofs.
In particular, assuming that X is a complete lattice guarantees that A and B are
nonempty and that ∨A and ∧B exist5.
Theorem 2: Let X be a poset and F : X → X be a correspondence. (i) If F
is upper increasing and has a greatest element then ∨A, whenever it exists, is the
greatest ﬁxpoint of F. (ii) If F is lower increasing and has a least element then ∧B,
whenever it exists, is the least ﬁxpoint of F.
Proof: Point (i). Let 1 ∈ F (∨A) be the greatest element of F (∨A). By Lemma
1, ∨A ∈ A and so there exists y ∈ F (∨A) such that ∨A ≤ y. Thus, for every x ∈ A,
x ≤ ∨A ≤ y ≤ 1, were 1 ∈ F (∨A) is the greatest element of F (∨A). By upper
4Notice that the intersection of A and B, that is, the ﬁxpoint set of F, needs not to be a
complete lattice (indeed, not even a lattice). Otherwise we would not need Theorem 3 in this paper.
Take for example any unordered a,b in X and set A = {0,a,b,a ∨ b} and B = {1,a,b,a ∧ b}. The
intersection A ∩ B is not a lattice.
5Theorem 2 has been already proved in Calciano (2007, Th. 1), but without recurring explicitly
to Lemma 2.
5increasingness of F, from ∨A ≤ 1 it follows that there is some y ∈ F (1) such that
1 ≤ y. Thus 1 ∈ A, and so 1 ≤ ∨A. Hence 1 = ∨A ∈ F (∨A). Thus ∨A is a
ﬁxpoint of F. It is the greatest ﬁxpoint since the ﬁxpoint set of F is a subset of A.
Point (ii). Consider the dual poset Xd of X. Since F is lower increasing on X,
it is upper increasing on Xd, and since F (x) has a least element for every x ∈ X, it
has a greatest element for every x ∈ Xd. Furthermore, ∧B in X coincides with ∨A
in Xd. Hence, by applying to Xd the result obtained in (i) for X, we have done.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 3 below generalizes point (b) of Theorem 1 in a similar way as Theorem
2 generalized point (a) of Theorem 1. Namely, Theorem 3 assumes a form of
increasingness for F weaker than Veinott-increasingness, and requires existence of
certain extremal elements for F instead of requiring it to be subcomplete-sublattice-
valued.
Some new notation is needed. Let X be a poset with a greatest element 1 and
F : X → X be a correspondence. For a ﬁxed h ∈ X, deﬁne the correspondence
Fh : [h,1] → [h,1] as
Fh (x) = F (x) ∩ [h,1].
Notice that this correspondence may well be empty.
Theorem 3: Let X be a complete lattice and F : X → X be a correspondence.
If F has a greatest element, is upper increasing, is strongly lower increasing, and
if for every h ∈ A the correspondence Fh has a least element whenever nonempty,
then the ﬁxpoint set of F is a nonempty complete lattice.
Remark. With the assumptions of Veinott-Zhou’s theorem F would be subcomplete-
sublattice-valued and so Fh, whenever nonempty, would be subcomplete-sublattice-
valued as well, and hence would have both a least and a greatest element.
Proof of Theorem 3: Call E the ﬁxpoint set of F. Since X is complete,
then B is nonempty and ∧B exists. Observe that the correspondence F0 coincides
with F, which is assumed to be nonempty. So F has a least element and, being
strongly lower increasing, it is lower increasing. Thus by point (ii) of Theorem 1,
E is nonempty and ∧B is its least element.
We now show that E is a join-complete lattice. Hence, having a least element,
it is a complete lattice. Pick any nonempty subset T ⊆ E. We want to show that
∨ET exists, which is equivalent to show that the set E∩[∨T,1] has a least element.
To prove the latter, consider the correspondence F∨T. Observe that the ﬁxpoint
set of F∨T is exactly E ∩ [∨T,1]. We show that F∨T has a least ﬁxpoint.
Claim 1. The correspondence F∨T is nonempty. Indeed, we prove a little more,
namely that for every h ∈ A, the correspondence Fh is nonempty. Then, because
by Lemma 1 we know that ∨T ∈ A, Claim 1 is proved. Indeed, pick any h ∈ A
and any x ∈ [h,1]. Since h ∈ A there is some y ∈ F (h) such that h ≤ y, and since
h ≤ x and F is upper increasing, for such y ∈ F (h) there is some z ∈ F (x) such
that y ≤ z. Hence z ∈ F (x) ∩ [h,1]. 
Claim 2. F∨T is lower increasing. Again, we prove a little more, namely that
for every h ∈ X such that Fh is nonempty, Fh is lower increasing. Pick indeed any
x,y ∈ [h,1] such that x ≤ y. Pick any b ∈ Fh (y) and any a ∈ Fh (x). If a ≤ b we
6are done. If a is unordered with b, then by strong lower increasingness of F there
is some p ∈ F (x) such that a ∧ b ≤ p ≤ b. Since h minorizes the set {a,b}, then
h ≤ a ∧ b, and so p is in Fh (x). If b < a, by strong lower increasingness of F there
is some p ∈ F (x) such that b = a ∧ b ≤ p ≤ b, and since h ≤ a ∧ b, then b is in
Fh (x). Hence Fh is lower increasing. 
By Claim 1, the set F∨T (1) = F (1) ∩ [∨T,1] is nonempty, and since F (1) ∩
[∨T,1] ≡ F∨T (1) ∩ [∨T,1], then 1 belongs to the set
BT := {x ∈ [∨T,1] : F∨T (x) ∩ [∨T,x] 6= ∅},
which is then nonempty. Furthermore ∧BT exists by completeness of X, and it
clearly belongs to [∨T,1] because ∨T minorizes BT. Finally, the correspondence
F∨T has a least element by assumption and hence satisﬁes all the assumptions
of point (ii) of Theorem 1. As a result, for the least element 0 ∈ F∨T (∧BT),
0 = ∧BT ∈ F∨T (∧BT). Hence ∧BT is the least ﬁxpoint of F∨T. Since T was
arbitrary, E is a join-complete lattice and the theorem is proved. Q.E.D.
5. Increasing Selections
We have proved our Theorems 2 and 3 without recurring to increasing-selection
arguments, hence without using Tarski’s ﬁxpoint theorem. It is natural, then, to
pose the following question: there would be any added-value in using increasing-
selection arguments instead, or in other words, are we assuming too much in order
to prove Theorems 2 and 3 without recurring to Tarski’s result?
We address these questions with respect to the increasingness assumptions for
the correspondence F that we have done in Theorems 2 and 3. We consider these
assumptions for F ‘minimal’ if they are equivalent to the increasingness of some
selection f from F, where f - upon being increasing - allows to prove the theorem
by applying Tarski’s ﬁxpoint result.
In Theorem 4 below we show that, keeping ﬁxed all the other assumptions of
Theorem 2, assuming that F is lower increasing is equivalent as assuming that a
certain selection from F is increasing, this selection having the same least ﬁxpoint
as F (an analogous result holds for the greatest ﬁxpoint of F).
In Theorem 5 we show that, keeping ﬁxed all the other assumptions of Theorem
3, assuming that F is strongly lower increasing implies that a certain selection from
F is increasing, this selection having the same ﬁxpoint set of F.
Unfortunately, in Theorem 5 the equivalence does not hold. Hence the notion of
increasingness for F is minimal in Theorem 2, but it is not in Theorem 3.
5.1. Extremal Fixpoints. If one is interested only in the existence of extremal
ﬁxed point, then the proof of Theorem 2 suggests how to pick selections from F
that have the same extremal ﬁxpoints as F. In particular, if F has a least (greatest)
element and a least (greatest) ﬁxpoint, then by Tarski’s theorem the least (greatest)
element, whenever it is an increasing function, has the same least (greatest) ﬁxpoint
as F, and so represents a proper selection in this context.
The next theorem shows that, assuming F lower (upper) increasing, is equivalent
as assuming that the least (greatest) element is an increasing selection from F, and
7hence it is the weakest form of increasingness for correspondences that implies this
property for the least (greatest) element.
In this sense, we cannot relax the assumption of lower (upper) increasingness
in Theorem 2 to show existence of extremal ﬁxed points. We are using, given the
other assumptions of Theorem 2, the weakest form of increasingness for F in order
to get the desired result.
Theorem 4: Let X be a poset and F : X → X be a correspondence with a least
(greatest) element. F is lower (upper) increasing if and only if the least (greatest)
element of F is an increasing selection from F.
Proof: We prove the theorem for the least element. The case for the greatest
element follows then by duality. For z in X, let 0z denote the least element of F (z).
Pick x,y in X with x ≤ y. Assume that the least element of F is an increasing
selection. Hence, for any b in F (y), 0x ≤ 0y ≤ b, hence F is lower increasing. In
the other direction, if F is lower increasing, given 0y there is some a in F (x) such
that 0x ≤ a ≤ 0y. Q.E.D.
5.2. Structure of the Fixpoint Set. Theorem 4 can be used also in the context
of Theorem 3; that is, when one is indeed interested in the whole order-structure of
the ﬁxpoint set. In fact, the proof of Theorem 3 makes evident that what matters,
in order for the (nonempty) ﬁxpoint set of F to be a complete lattice, is that for
each subset T of the ﬁxpoint set of F, the correspondence F∨T be lower increasing.
In the presence of Theorem 4, this is equivalent to assuming that, for every T, the
least element of F∨T is an increasing selection. We have indeed introduced strong
lower increasingness to provide for a global condition on F which guarantees that
each correspondence F∨T is lower increasing.
However, there is a certain ﬂaw in the selection-argument in Theorem 4: that
we need an ad-hoc selection for each ﬁxpoint of F. And this would be even more
the case in the context of Theorem 3.
We introduce now a selection from F that works for every ﬁxpoint of F; that
is, which has exactly the same ﬁxpoint set of F. We show that this selection is
increasing if F is strongly lower increasing. The vice-versa however is not true,
that is, our selection can be increasing without F being strongly lower increasing.
In such sense, there may be some room to relax the assumption of strong lower
increasingness for F in Theorem 3.
Consider the set A and the function l : A → X deﬁned as
l(x) = min{F (x) ∩ [x,1]}.
Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, in particular that F has a greatest element
and is upper increasing and that, for each h ∈ A, the correspondence Fh has a least
element, the function l is indeed well-deﬁned (see Claim 1 of Theorem 3), in the
sense that the min does exist. It is furthermore evident that the ﬁxpoint set of l is
exactly that of F. Function l is a selection from the restriction of F to the set A.
Notice that when we study the ﬁxpoint set of F, the behavior of F outside set A is
indeed irrelevant.
8In order to apply Tarski theorem to l, we would need A to be a complete lattice,
l to map A into itself, and l to be increasing. All these properties are guaranteed
by the assumptions of Theorem 3.
In particular, if X is a complete lattice and F is upper increasing and has a
greatest element, Lemma 1 guarantees that A is a complete lattice. We address
the other two conditions below. Add to the assumptions stated to prove the next
results those, aforementioned, that make selection l well-deﬁned.
Lemma 2: If F is upper increasing, then l maps A into itself.
Proof: Pick any h ∈ A. We want to show that the least element l(h) := 0h
is in A. By the deﬁnition of l, we know that 0h ∈ F (h) and h ≤ 0h. But then,
since F is upper increasing, for such 0h ∈ F (h) there exists some x ∈ F (0h) with
0h ≤ x, which proves the claim. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5: If F is strongly lower increasing, then l is increasing.
Proof: Pick any x,y ∈ A with x ≤ y. Set l(x) := 0x and l(y) = 0y. Pick any
a ∈ F (x) ∩ [x,1] and consider 0y. By strong lower increasingness of F, there is
some p ∈ F (x) such that 0y ∧ a ≤ p ≤ 0y. But x ≤ a and y ≤ 0y, and so the
inequality x ≤ y implies that x minorizes {a,0y}. Hence x ≤ 0y ∧ a, which implies
that p ∈ F (x) ∩ [x,1]. Thus 0x ≤ p and hence 0x ≤ 0y. Q.E.D.
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